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Towards A Conceptual Framework of Beneficiary Accountability by NGOs:  




Beneficiary accountability (BA) by NGOs is a contested notion. Extant research suggests 
disparity and complexity over its meanings, practices and forms. Its operationalisation, 
although important, has been a challenge for the NGO scholars, practitioners, donors and the 
relevant policymakers. In this study, we offer a conceptual framework of BA based on extensive 
literature review. It highlights four key attributes of BA – casually demanded, action based, 
quasi-instrumental and focuses on beneficiary self-reliance. We then empirically illustrate the 
framework by drawing evidence from a case study. The data for this research has been 
collected via a fieldwork based case study in Indonesia and the methods employed include 
interviews, focus groups, observation and documentary analysis.  
 




• Beneficiary accountability is a contested and misunderstood term 
• We offer a conceptual framework of beneficiary accountability  
• It is casually demanded and action-based 
• It is also quasi-instrumental and focuses on beneficiary self-reliance 




The role of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in delivering development goals 
alongside government and other institutions is becoming increasingly important (Banks, 
Hulme, & Edwards, 2015). With their capacity for social innovation, NGOs – especially those 
performing development and humanitarian programmes – have become important players to 
fill the gaps in declining governments’ provision of services to society. While these 
programmes are necessary, they may not in themselves be sufficient to solve the entire societal 
problems that governments are expected to address (Clark, 1992). With limited resources, it is 
challenging for NGOs to work on a larger national or international scale. They are required to 
deliver efficient and sustainable programmes that would fulfill their mission while 
demonstrating accountability to a range of NGOs’ stakeholders, including donors, 
beneficiaries, governments and others.  
One way in which NGOs can develop sustainable programmes is by engaging 
beneficiaries from the planning stage onwards (UNDP, 2014). Beneficiaries should be central 
to the effective need assessments and for the justification of service design and delivery (Hall 
& O’Dwyer, 2017; Wellens & Jegers, 2014). Taking an active part in NGOs’ programmes 
helps beneficiaries to develop greater attachment to the NGOs and cooperate effectively for 
their success (Awio, Northcott, & Lawrence, 2011). In this way, NGOs are able to ensure that 
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beneficiaries become self-reliant and manage programmes independently by the end of their 
period of assistance.  
In order for NGOs to engage beneficiaries in their programmes and have further impact 
on their lives, a strong sense of trust is essential. Mishra (1996) argued that trust could increase 
truthful communication between transacting parties, which leads to collaboration in using 
scarce resources. Trust may also increase cooperative efforts and reduce transaction costs 
(Bromiley & Cummings, 1992), as well as incentivise individuals to invest in the relationship 
and mitigate tensions and conflict (Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). In contrast, lack of 
trust, as Tyler and Kramer (1996) note, may cause the grantors of trust to be exposed to 
unnecessary risks and to impose costly sanctioning mechanisms to protect their interests. In the 
context of NGOs, lack of trust may lead to an uncooperative stance from beneficiaries. 
Consequently, NGOs may end up with a situation of less efficient use of resources to assist 
beneficiaries, with the possibility of limiting their operational formats to ‘hit-and-run-type’ 
programmes (Clark, 1992) with pressing demands on their performance.  
By delivering their promises, providing access to information about their performance, 
and being more responsive to beneficiaries’ expectations and demands, NGOs can improve 
their beneficiary accountability (BA) (Brown & Moore, 2001). In this sense, the issue of BA 
warrants further exploration, and indeed a number of studies have indicated the need for more 
understanding of the operationalisation of BA (see for example, Boomsma & O'Dwyer, 2014; 
Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006). However, the operationalisation of BA is seen as inordinately 
difficult due to the fact that its definition is unclear (Wellens & Jegers, 2014).  
This study, therefore, aims to develop a conceptual framework of BA and to provide an 
empirical illustration of it via an in-depth case study. Here, we refer to BA as accountability 
discharged by an NGO to its beneficiaries. BA is understood as a notion embedded in the 
organisational setting of the NGO. This setting involves a number of social actors including 
the beneficiaries and others such as volunteers, NGO officials, donors, government officials 
and other NGOs. We further suggest that BA is formed during the interaction of beneficiaries 
with NGOs and their stakeholders. Empirically, we provide an important insight that a number 
of interactions formed within those programmes may facilitate the shaping, maintenance and 
further development of BA. In doing so, we respond to the above calls for studies on BA. We 
also contribute to the conceptualisation of BA by investigating various attributes of it 
manifested within the context of programme delivery. We then present an empirical illustration 
in the context of a large Indonesian humanitarian NGO. 
In the following sections, we review the key literature on NGO accountability in general 
and BA in particular aiming to identify the key attributes of BA. We then explain the research 
approach deployed in this study. We present the empirical evidence to illustrate and evaluate 
the conceptual framework of BA developed earlier in the paper. We suggest that this 
framework may aid further research in BA and encourage practitioners to consider the 
multidimensional nature of BA in their programme delivery approaches.  In the penultimate 
section we discuss and analyse the empirical materials in the light of prior research and a 
conceptual framework developed earlier in the paper. We complete the paper with a summary 
and conclusion. 
 
2. A Conceptual Framework of BA by NGOs 
 BA has been a contested notion. Extant research suggests disparity and complexity over 
its meaning, practices and forms (Cavill & Sohail, 2007; O’Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015; Taylor, 
Tharapos, & Sidaway, 2014). In this section, we will review the relevant literature. Briefly, in 
this literature we identify a number of studies suggesting that BA is multidimensional in nature 
and varies at different relational levels (O’Leary, 2017; Romzek, LeRoux, & Blackmar, 2012; 
Taylor et al., 2014).  We argue that BA should be considered in its context and, in the case of 
4 
 
an NGO, there might be different perspectives on it. To develop a conceptual framework of 
BA, we highlight its four key attributes – casually demanded, action based, quasi-instrumental 
and focuses on beneficiary self-reliance (see Figure 1). Even though we distinguish between 
these attributes, we acknowledge that some of the attributes are, in reality, interconnected. We 
elaborate on each of these attributes below. 
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
 
2.1. BA is casually demanded 
A number of prior studies indicate that BA should be seen through a ‘socialising’ lens 
(Roberts, 1991) which evolves in line with the systems of social, political and cultural 
interactions that take place in the communities where an NGO operates. This perspective 
provides the insight that BA reflects a moral order of social practices to fulfil a specified 
promise involving the reciprocal rights and obligations of the interacting actors (Brown & 
Moore, 2001; Ebrahim, 2005; Jacobs & Walker, 2004; O’Leary, 2017; Schweiker, 1993; 
Shearer, 2002). Such a view, therefore, implies that BA tends to be casually demanded. It goes 
beyond the mere consequence of a formal principal-agent relationship, or based on a single 
lens such as that NGOs are only held accountable to certain formal authorities (Coule, 2015). 
Rather, BA tends to involve informal interactions, such as ongoing communications with the 
NGO partners, staff and beneficiaries and the sharing of information that may include an 
NGO’s values and missions (Coule, 2015). Meanwhile, others have also noted that putting in 
place too many formal systems would not be effective in relation to beneficiaries’ interactions 
with NGOs (Dixon, Ritchie, & Siwale, 2006; Wellens & Jegers, 2014). Additionally, Hyndman 
and McConville (2018) find that most beneficiaries tend to be more interested in their personal 
outcomes and only in activities with which they are personally involved. Formal reports are 
often perceived as including too much irrelevant information and may result in a ‘cold view of 
the NGOs’. This finding echoed Gray, Bebbington, and Collison’s (2006) assertion that the 
requirement for a formal accountability mechanism may diminish when performance can be 
easily observed by the relevant stakeholders (including beneficiaries).  
According to socialising perspectives, casual interactions depend on ‘connectedness’. 
The importance of ‘connectedness’, which is the ability to connect, is central to the types of 
social connections formed between NGOs and beneficiaries (see Coleman, 1988, etc.). We 
identify that social connections between NGO officers and beneficiaries, which are also 
influenced by donors, volunteers and other relevant stakeholders of the NGO are useful to 
facilitate BA. Moreover, as BA may be casually demanded by beneficiaries, beneficiaries’ trust 
and closeness towards the NGO are essential (Awio et al., 2011; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2007). 
Though reflecting a virtuous circle, accountability – albeit in its casual form – is noted by 
Hyndman and McConville (2018) as a pre-requisite, or at least essential ingredient, for NGOs 
to gain beneficiaries’ trust. This is going to be explored further in Section 2.2 below. 
 
2.2. BA is action based 
While it tends to be casually demanded by the beneficiaries, BA is also characterised 
by an action-based experience of the NGO programmes. Experiencing NGOs’ services may 
boost beneficiaries’ perceptions of NGOs’ accountability and may help to build their trust in 
the NGOs (Hyndman & McConville, 2018). Edwards and Hulme (1996) suggest that ‘as 
independent organisations with a mission to pursue’, NGOs need to demonstrate that they can 
perform effectively and be accountable for their actions and commitments. Such a mission-
driven perspective may enable NGOs to focus more on their actions than administrative 
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(financial) matters (Hall & O’Dwyer, 2017). Yet more, the latter is often perceived as a 
distraction from NGOs’ main jobs or even as a waste of time and money (Agyemang, O’Dwyer, 
Unerman, & Awumbila, 2017). 
 Empirically, Awio et al. (2011) examined how small grass roots NGOs discharge BA 
through engagement and participation of the community that they serve by establishing trusting 
interactions between the community members and the NGOs. According to the study, effective 
BA ‘must be reconceptualised as accounts of actions and transactions, rather than the numerical 
abstractions of accounting’ (Awio et al., 2011, p. 86). A similar view is also held by Taylor et 
al. (2014) who have examined BA practices in relation to the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires 
disaster in Victoria, Australia. They found that involvement of beneficiaries in NGOs’ 
programmes was more important than written reports to beneficiaries.  
 
2.3. BA is quasi-instrumental 
Unlike the casual attribute of BA that we discussed earlier, which tends to involve more 
implicit, subjective standards of appraisal, and requires no external evaluator to directly assess 
the accountability practices, the quasi-instrumental attribute of BA is linked to the notion of 
‘act of account-giving’ (Mulgan, 2000; Roberts & Scapens, 1985). The latter is often 
conceptualised as a procedural notion with formalised administrative practices (Sinclair, 1995; 
Walker, 2016) that requires a legitimising mechanism which expects organisations to formally 
report their activities (Roberts, 1991; Schweiker, 1993; Shearer, 2002). Such a type of 
accountability is demanded particularly when there is a lack of closeness between accountor 
and accountee (Rawls, 1972). It is commonly discharged through various formal formats such 
as reports, disclosures, performance assessments and evidence of compliance with regulations. 
Prior literature (Agyemang, Awumbila, Unerman, & O’Dwyer, 2009; Ebrahim, 2003) 
has noted that quasi-instrumental accountability, which may involve beneficiaries in its data-
gathering process, includes a ‘participatory review report’ and ‘programme audit report’. In 
preparing these two reports which are normally requested by external, upward stakeholders 
(e.g. donors or governments), NGOs often conduct surveys that might include evaluation of 
past or existing programmes (Agyemang, Awumbila, Unerman, et al., 2009; Ebrahim, 2003). 
However, the review and audit reports have been criticised as merely focusing on short-term 
results,  while the participation of beneficiaries may be pseudo/symbolic and ineffective to 
improve NGOs’ future performance. This is because, in practice, the two mechanisms are often 
conducted on an ad hoc basis, unstandardised and biased as they tend to use first-party 
evaluation (de Montclos, 2012; Mir & Bala, 2015). Furthermore, it has been argued that there 
is less expectation from NGOs to provide reports or disclosure to the beneficiary community 
due to the cost-benefit aspect of using this mechanism. Such reports are less relevant in terms 
of demonstrating accountability to beneficiaries (Kilby, 2006; Mir & Bala, 2015; Schmitz, 
Raggo, & Vijfeijken, 2012).  
In addressing such issues, Hyndman and McDonnell (2009) argue that to be effectively 
used as instruments of BA, participatory review and programme audit reporting mechanisms 
require a sufficient amount of interactions between beneficiaries and NGOs. Such interactions, 
then, may allow the former to be involved in the decision-making process and have bargaining 
power in NGO programmes’ design and delivery.  
 
2.4. BA focuses on beneficiary self-reliance 
In order to live up to their raison d’être in providing maximum benefits to beneficiaries, 
NGOs need to avoid accountability disparity – a condition whereby NGOs put more priority 
on accountability to the powerful stakeholders (i.e. donors and governments) as compared to 
their not-so-powerful stakeholders (i.e. staff or beneficiaries) (Agyemang, Awumbila, 
Unerman, et al., 2009; Ebrahim, 2003; Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009). In exerting such efforts, 
6 
 
Ebrahim (2003) observed that NGOs can be motivated by internal and external factors. Internal 
factors include their commitment to achieving their mission and being transparent to their 
stakeholders, as well as their sense of moral duty and awareness of an obligation (O’Dwyer & 
Boomsma, 2015; Ospina, Diaz, & O’Sullivan, 2002). External factors include their willingness 
to fulfil the accountability requirements as set out by their stakeholders, such as pressure from 
donors (Benjamin, 2012; Christensen & Ebrahim, 2006; Mir & Bala, 2015) and social sanctions 
(de Montclos, 2012). 
 Consequently, to keep NGOs’ commitment to assist beneficiaries in improving their 
welfare, it would be insufficient for an NGO to only provide functional, short-term and 
instrumental accountability. Rather, they are challenged to move towards a more strategic, 
long-term and expressive form of accountability (Avina, 1993; Ebrahim, 2010; Edwards & 
Hulme, 1996; Knutsen & Brower, 2010). The latter type of accountability can be delivered by 
NGOs via assessment of the developmental (long-term) impact of their programmes for 
beneficiaries. With such an assessment, NGOs make continuous improvements by strategically 
empowering beneficiaries, as individuals and members of their communities, to become self-
reliant and rise confidently from their perilous conditions (MacIntyre et al., 2013).  
 Besides requirements of such attempts from the side of the NGOs, empowerment of 
beneficiaries also demands an active involvement of the latter to help the NGOs to go beyond 
performing service delivery and to further act as a catalyst for empowering beneficiaries to 
become more independent upon completion of the NGOs’ period of assistance (Hilhorst, 2002; 
Kopinak, 2013; Wellens & Jegers, 2014). Via participation, the NGO and its beneficiaries can 
create ‘community capacity’ that has the leveraging potential to generate beneficiaries’ sense 
of self-dependence, solve collective problems, improve or maintain the well-being of the 
society and stimulate microeconomic development (Ospina et al., 2002). An element of 
beneficiary active participation in programme level decision-making is also considered as an 
important requirement by donors in channelling funding to NGOs. As noted by Uddin and 
Belal (2019), BA is interlinked with donor accountability. Their case study of BRAC 
Bangladesh revealed that donors even allocate some funding to enhance BA and work with 
other NGOs and regulators to ensure that NGO-funded programmes have been able to have an 
impact on the lives of beneficiaries. Their finding provides support to arguments made by 
O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) and Hyndman and McConville (2018) that donors actively 
promote beneficiary participation and beneficiary-feedback mechanisms. 
However, participation is effectively a means to an end, not an end in itself (Vervisch, 
Titeca, Vlassenroot, & Braeckman, 2013). Earlier research has cautioned that participation 
could represent a challenge in achieving the goal of generating community capacity, 
particularly when beneficiaries are unable to voice their genuine concerns to the NGOs 
(O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2010; O’Leary, 2017).  
In contrast, non-engagement of beneficiaries ‘strikes at the heart of effective capacity 
building’ (Brown & Moore, 2001, p. 584). To encourage beneficiaries’ active involvement, 
studies such as Romzek et al. (2012) suggest NGOs make use of shared norms (which may 
include faith), shared goals (e.g. self-reliance of beneficiaries and their communities) and the 
facilitative behaviours (e.g. frequent communication) of interorganisational and interpersonal 
relationships between NGOs and their beneficiaries. So long as beneficiaries’ expectations of 
NGOs are confirmed through commitment to assisting beneficiaries to accomplish the shared 
goals with the NGOs’ competence and caring attitude, beneficiaries’ trust in NGOs is likely to 
grow (Creed & Miles, 1996; Fisher, 2013; Kasperson, 1986; Mayer & Gavin, 2005; Rosanas 
& Velilla, 2003). This trust will, furthermore, keep them actively involved in the NGOs’ 
programmes. On the other hand, a lack of trust from beneficiaries may act to prevent them from 
cooperating with NGOs and make them more reluctant to participate in NGOs’ programmes 
(MacIntyre et al., 2013). 
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3. Research Design 
The fieldwork for this study was undertaken in an NGO, ACT (Aksi Cepat Tanggap) 
Foundation in Indonesia. Founded in April 2005 with social and humanitarian aims, it features 
unique characteristics such as its large size in terms of volunteers involved in addition to 
funding available and its outreach activities. For this reason, our study is different from many 
of the other case studies investigating BA practices (e.g. Awio et al., 2011; O’Leary, 2017), 
that are based usually on small organisations on the ground.  
As a well-resourced NGO, ACT is run by both professional staff and volunteers. As of 
December 2015, ACT has employed 164 full-time employees and had the support of 141,746 
volunteers to serve its beneficiaries, numbering 20,098,315. Most NGOs in Indonesia have an 
average of only five paid employees, are supported by 21 volunteers and provide services to 
about 423 individual beneficiaries (BPS, 2015). In general, ACT’s activities are supported by 
four main departments, namely the operational (managing operations and administrative 
activities), humanitarian network (handling disaster emergency and relief management, 
community development and disaster preparedness programmes as well as volunteer 
management), philanthropy network (managing donors and fundraising activities) and global 
philanthropy and communication (managing ACT’s interaction with the media, global 
stakeholders and partners) departments. In addition to the programmes managed by the 
humanitarian network department, ACT also runs religious-based programmes focusing on the 
management of Qurbani, Zakat and Waqf.1 The latter programmes seem to reflect ACT’s 
commitment to practising Islamic beliefs in promoting humanitarian values and decency. 
While the above departments are the main functions that handle ACT’s day-to-day activities, 
their respective names, chains of command and coordination, as well as the remits of each 
department have purposely been made flexible by ACT leaders in order for them to be able to 
cater for the needs and dynamics of the organisation. 
Besides the above support from its human resources, ACT, as a well-resourced NGO, 
obtains funding from various sources but, in most years, the majority of its funds are derived 
from humanitarian income, with less than 4% of its funds generated from zakat funds paid by 
the public, with the remainder derived from other income sources. The details of ACT’s 
income, based on ACT’s 2011–2015 financial reports, are presented in Figure 2. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
Figure 2 shows that most years have seen an increase ACT’s funds, with the exception 
of a slight decrease in 2015. The major increase in funds in 2014 happened when the income 
from humanitarian funds more than doubled as compared to 2013. The occurrence of several 
major disasters in 2014 (e.g. Gaza Crisis and Kelud Eruption) may explain the increase in 
ACT’s funding. Moreover, based on the income generated, since 2012, ACT can be considered 
as a large NGO according to the classification by Crawford, Dunne, Stevenson, and Hannah 
                                                 
1 Qurban (Qurbani) is the voluntary (but strongly recommended) sacrifice of an animal (e.g. a sheep, goat, cow, camel) to Allah the Almighty 
during the period of Eid ul Adha (one of two holy days celebrated by Muslims). Some or all of the sacrificed animal’s meat is distributed to 
people in need. ACT escalates the social impact of this annual religious ritual by empowering farmers in many different regions in Indonesia 
to become suppliers of sacrificial animals while in return providing them with modern farming knowledge. Other than Indonesia, ACT also 
performs the slaughter of sacrificial animals internationally in 27 other countries in need.  
Zakat (Zakah) is the compulsory payment of alms when one’s wealth has reached a determined threshold (nisaab), the beneficiaries of which 
are specified in the Qur’an (the poor and needy, among others). It is one of the five pillars of Islam (along with shahadah (declaration of faith), 
prayer, fasting in Ramadan and Hajj) that Muslims are obliged to perform. 
Waqaf (Waqf) is the voluntary donation of cash or assets (land, buildings, water wells, etc.) for religious or charitable purposes, the 
disbursement of which must be carried out in sharia-compliant ways. ACT is keen to revitalise the great potential of waqf in the country by 
offering both social and productive waqf programmes to its donors. The benefits of social waqf assets may be directly received by beneficiaries 
(e.g. water from a well, education services provided by schools), while those of productive waqf assets are generated from the proceeds of the 
investments made in those endowment assets (e.g. the revenue generated from space rented in a waqf building). 
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(2009), since its annual income has exceeded £1m. As part of its accountability mechanism to 
donors and other stakeholders, and in alignment with its aims to apply independent, non-
discriminatory, transparent, accountable and neutral-objective principles, ACT has published 
financial statements audited by public accounting firms since the beginning of its 
establishment. 
Through its combination of human and financial resources, ACT is able to carry out its 
various activities, which mainly focus on two main programmes to handle both natural 
(earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanos, floods, etc.) and social disasters (social conflict, war, hunger, 
malnutrition, poverty, corruption, etc.). These programmes cover emergency response, relief 
and recovery management as well as preparedness aimed at mitigating damage caused by future 
disasters and are dedicated to catering to the needs of beneficiaries. In this study, beneficiaries 
are defined as recipients of ACT programmes who may be in a position to reveal their 
preferences (including local leaders of beneficiaries’ communities) or may not be in such a 
position (e.g. children, mentally handicapped) (Puyvelde, Caers, Bois, & Jegers, 2012). 
Considering the comprehensiveness of the data and to highlight how ACT practises BA, this 
study focused on two of ACT’s programmes: the 2010 Merapi eruption programme 
(representing ACT’s activities in handling natural disasters) and the Integrated Nutritious 
Workshops (exemplifying ACT’s responses to mitigating social disaster, particularly 
malnutrition at a village in South Tangerang, West Java from October 2012 to November 
2013). The analysis is also enriched by an investigation into the links between these 
programmes and other ACT initiatives. 
This study employs an interpretive methodology as the views of participants and their 
subjective understandings inform the empirical evidence gathered (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). 
The fieldwork was conducted over four months (Aug–Nov 2014) using interviews, focus group 
discussions (FGDs), observations and document reviews.  
 The interviews (46 in total) as the most significant part of this study aim to seek 
knowledge, understanding and stories of personal experience through conversation (Mears, 
2009; Mills, Eurepos, & Wiebe, 2010). The semi-structured interview format was used for this 
study, wherein the authors prepared questions prior to the interview while also remaining open 
to the possibility of developing further questions relevant to the interviewees’ responses 
(Bryman, 2012). The interviews involved members of ACT management, staff, beneficiaries, 
representatives of institutional donors, individual donors, as well as experts and academia (see 
Table 1) and took place for about one hour, on average. Consent to be recorded, noted and 
transcribed was given by each interviewee.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
 FGDs were conducted to obtain a more in-depth understanding from different 
individual beneficiaries in the group to address the research question about their views on BA. 
The discussions were also aimed at establishing the presence of any ‘group effect’ on 
perceptions about the topic resulting from the interaction between the participants and which 
may have remained untapped during the individual interviews (Agyemang, Awumbila, & 
O’Dwyer, 2009; Morgan, 1996). Four FGDs were conducted with members of beneficiary 
communities (see the details in Table 1). An additional FGD was conducted with two donor 
representatives upon their request to allow a more comprehensive discussion. To minimise 
bias, participants were recruited following discussions with neutral parties (e.g. with 
volunteers) (Krueger & Casey, 2009).  
Other than the above two methods, the authors also conducted observations to gather 
meaningful and contextual information to aid in addressing the research question. ACT 
management granted us access to participate in several ACT meetings and undertake voluntary 
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work at the Qurbani festival at ACT’s Integrated Community Shelter, Mount Merapi area, 
Yogyakarta. During these observations, we documented and reflected points relating to the 
NGO’s management and stakeholders’ views on BA and the verbal and non-verbal cues behind 
their interactions and daily routines (Tedlock, 2005). Furthermore, from the fieldwork 
observation in Yogyakarta, we obtained significant additional information on ACT’s 
interactions with its beneficiaries, which it would not otherwise have been possible to access 
through the interviews and FGDs alone.  
 The authors have also used documentary analysis on both private and publicly available 
ACT documents to support analysis of the above data collection methods. The internal records 
used include ACT’s accounting and internal control manuals, programme audit reports, internal 
evaluation reports, the minutes of meetings and standard operating procedures. The publicly 
available information includes ACT’s annual reports and archived articles from ACT’s 
website. The summary of BA techniques identified from the above four data collection methods 
based on its degree of formality is presented in Figure 3, which indicates that the most 
commonly used mechanisms for discharging BA tend to be informal in nature (Edwards & 
Hulme, 1996) and require ongoing communication between beneficiaries and NGO personnel 
(Knutsen & Brower, 2010). More detailed explanations regarding these mechanisms will be 
elaborated in Section 4. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
In addition to the above methods, the authors also had several informal communications 
with a number of officers from ACT during the period of study, through emails and messaging 
services, to either confirm or request additional data, such as reports of programme audit and 
some statistical information on source and usage of funds. These further data gathering 
processes were guided by the attempts to address our research question. 
We have used thematic analysis of the data gathered and focused on ‘identifying, 
analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data’ (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 79). In 
conducting the analysis, we have combined the transcripts of interviews and FGDs with notes 
from observations and documentary reviews. We have continued our analysis by conducting 
open coding to distil concepts that emerged from the data. Next, we have grouped these first-
order codes which have affiliated features into second-order themes. With the codes and themes 
established, we have applied thematic analysis in an iterative way (Dixon et al., 2006; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). We did this by performing ‘continuous movement back and forth between 
theoretical conceptualisation, data collection, analysis, and interpretation’ (Bryman, 2012, p. 
559) to achieve our research aims, while at the same time examining other issues that emerged 
from the data.  
 
4. Findings 
 In accordance with the conceptual framework discussed in Section 2, in the sections 
below we consider each of the four key attributes of the comprehensive BA framework (BA is 
casually demanded, action based, quasi-instrumental and focuses on beneficiary self-reliance). 
We provide selected empirical examples of how the above key attributes of BA manifest in the 
practices of ACT’s programme delivery. 
 
4.1. BA is casually demanded 
 
 
‘Most of them (beneficiaries) have never asked for the reports. […] Who among the beneficiaries 




 ‘Accountability’ beyond ‘accountancy’ appears to be the primary focus when discussing 
BA. In general, most beneficiaries, representatives of institutional donors and officers of ACT 
do not perceive BA to be satisfied in the form of a set of financial or other formal reports. The 
norm is to expect the NGO to fulfil its promises to the beneficiaries. It is expected that while 
the NGO interacts with the beneficiaries, a non-formal communication will be an ‘account 
giving’ exchange for the beneficiaries (Mulgan, 2000). Roberts (1991) notes that 
accountability’s social structures are shaped by interactions while patterns of communication 
and expectations are formed. This is evident in an expression made by a beneficiary 
representing a community who received ACT’s assistance in the 2010 Merapi eruption 
emergency and recovery programme. The memory of informal communication that he and his 
community had with ACT made him consider the NGO’s representatives on the ground as their 
own family: 
 
‘Our communication with ACT has been like family. […] I regard all of them as my own family.’ 
 
 Another beneficiary who was also one of the survivors of 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake 
supported the above view by testifying how the ACT team continuously maintain a meaningful 
communication with the beneficiary’s community even though many years have passed since 
the NGO completed its programmes to help the community: 
 
‘We still have good communication with the ACT. They always sent us goats or cow in the Eid ul 
Adha. The ACT’s president also visited me last week.’ 
 
 Furthermore, in our case, beneficiaries did not think that systematic and fully disclosed 
reporting influenced their judgment of whether an NGO was accountable or not. This view is 
reflected in a comment made by a beneficiary of the ACT’s community development 
programme: 
 
‘About the funds from the donor, I think we do not need to know about it […] for me, even if I know 
about it, it is not so important for me [laughing].’ 
 
 Likewise, two other beneficiaries of ACT stated in similar tones: 
 
 ‘In my opinion, ACT is responsible for reporting to the donors, not to us – the beneficiaries. […] 
We only knew about the general financial reporting through the media. ACT did not directly report 
to us. I thought it was not my concern. I just did not want to know.’ (ACT Beneficiary in the 2010 
Merapi eruption emergency and recovery programme)  
 
‘We did not need to know too much detail about who gave the funds, how much the raised funds 
were. What was more important to us was that we were happy because of their help.’ (Informal 
leader2 in a community at Bantul regency, Yogyakarta, Indonesia and ACT Beneficiary in the 2006 
Yogyakarta earthquake emergency and recovery programme)  
 
 The above quotations demonstrate that formal and standardised financial reports are less 
preferred by the beneficiaries themselves. This is supported in the literature (for instance Dixon 
et al., 2006; Wellens & Jegers, 2014) where it has been suggested that placing emphasis on too 
many formal reports will not lead to effective communication between beneficiaries and NGOs. 
 As BA is casually demanded by the beneficiaries, there is a wider appreciation of the 
role of other parties involved and the way that their relationship with the NGO is facilitating 
the casual nature of BA. The more the trust and closeness between all parties and the NGO, the 
easier is the connection between the NGO and its beneficiaries (Awio et al., 2011). The above 
                                                 
2 We observed during our data collection period that an informal leader of a beneficiary community is normally someone who has lived in the 
community for a long time and is relatively better educated than other beneficiaries. The community members may also naturally choose 
him/her to be their informal leader due to his/her charisma, or higher understanding on religious matters, or because he/she can demonstrate 
ideas that seem advantageous to the community. 
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informal leader of the ACT beneficiary community at Bantul regency commented that the close 
interaction ACT had with them led to cooperative works between ACT representatives and 
members of beneficiary communities: 
 
‘I hold my thumbs up to the ACT’s president. His works were very systematic, he told us to this, 
this, and this. He asked us to work cooperatively. He suits me well, and we are a good team […] 
In rebuilding our (earthquake-destroyed) houses, we made the bricks by ourselves. I also proposed 
to the ACT’s president that the excavation of the house foundation could be used to make the bricks. 
I really support the ACT’s works. The community supports them as well.’  
 
 The smooth communication between parties resulted in trust and supported beneficiaries 
in the form of active participation in ACT’s programmes. However, as argued by Hyndman 
and McConville (2018), the trust may not only be built via interactive communication but also 
through NGOs’ real work to beneficiaries. This will be further explored in the following 
Section 4.2. 
 
4.2. BA is action based 
 
‘I never think that far. I have been grateful to get their assistance. What is the benefit for me to 
know about their accountability? I never even think to ask them about it. What I ask them was why 
the programme was ending?’ (ACT Beneficiary in the Integrated Nutritious Workshops) 
 
 In addition to the casual nature of BA, beneficiaries, as well as others in our case, have 
expressed the view that receiving actual assistance as a result of programme delivery is among 
the key ingredients which made them feel that ACT was accountable to them, and as evident 
in Taylor et al. (2014)’s study, such tangible works are more appreciated than mere provision 
of formal reports and other administrative processes that may be seen as a distraction from the 
more impactful actions of an NGO (Agyemang et al., 2017). 
 Another beneficiary of ACT’s Integrated Nutritious Workshops3 stated that observing 
the NGO’s concrete work and fulfilment on its promise to the beneficiary community may 
increase beneficiaries’ trust towards ACT. The beneficiary commented: 
 
‘My trust was built as I have seen their real work. […] When I saw them (ACT) providing the free 
medical treatment as they promised, oh I realise that they were right. […] I think ACT’s 
programme has been really good and perfect. They provided general practitioners counselling, 
paediatrician counselling, and nutritious packages. Their volunteer also worked very well. They 
treated the children with care and friendly manner. […] They gave us examples of how to take care 
of our children. […] I share those that have been taught in the ACT’s programme to the 
community.’ 
 
 Our evidence shows that concrete actions are not only essential to demonstrate the 
accountability of NGOs to beneficiaries. The actions coupled with social interactions with 
NGO representatives can develop trust as suggested by Hyndman and McConville (2018). 
Interestingly, the existence of beneficiaries’ trust also triggers their enthusiasm to actively 
participate in ACT programmes and disseminate the benefits of their participation for other 
members of the community who may not have attended the programmes. This fact provides 
support that such interplay may not only occur in small grass roots NGOs (as argued by Awio 
et al., 2011), but is also likely to take place in a large organisation such as ACT. 
 Beneficiaries’ active involvement in NGOs’ effective programmes may indicate how 
NGOs have been accountable in bringing a positive impact to the lives of beneficiaries and 
their communities, something which seems to be more valued by the beneficiaries and other 
stakeholders of NGOs in the less formal accountability mechanism (Edwards & Hulme, 1996; 
                                                 
3 ACT conducted the Integrated Nutritious Workshops in three stages: health care intervention (January–June 2013), health education for 
families (May–July 2013) and economic empowerment for mothers (September–December 2013). The programme was aimed to assist 
malnourished children with poor and inadequate nutrition as well as their parents to help them meet the needs of their families. 
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Hall & O’Dwyer, 2017). A volunteer, for instance, explained how BA can be discharged 
through the provision of services which meet the needs of beneficiaries in a timely manner: 
 
‘From the side of beneficiaries, accountability means fast service, and not to hold [the donations] 
and distribute them slowly. […] Beneficiaries tend to see quality and quantity of the given 
donations. They do not go into more details. As long as ACT gives good service, fast response, with 
the kind approach, usually they do not ask for any further form of accountability.’ (ACT Volunteer 
who assists ACT in various programmes) 
 
 Representatives of ACT’s institutional donors expressed a similar view: 
 
‘Who among the beneficiaries want to read the report? No one. Essentially, BA means that they 
can deliver what they have committed to the beneficiaries at the beginning of the programme. So 
basically, they should do what they say they would do.’ (Representative of Institutional Donor who 
trusted ACT to carry out a community development programme) 
 
 
‘It was not important to disclose the amount of the funds [to beneficiaries]. They do not need to 
know about it. […] The important thing was that they could see ACT’s works and get the benefits 
from the works.’ (Representative of Institutional Donor who trusted ACT to carry out the Integrated 
Nutritious Workshops) 
 
 While the representatives of ACT institutional donors seemed to be rather dismissive of 
the beneficiaries as evident in the above quotes, it does not mean that they were not asking 
ACT for financial accountability. Indeed, they do demand both financial and programme 
accountabilities which need to be audited by independent accounting firms. With regards to the 
accountability mechanism that ACT needs to discharge to its beneficiaries, we could argue in 
line with Gray et al. (2006) that the more an action is easily observed, the less demand there 
will be for a formal accountability mechanism. Even more, different degrees of formal, 
administrative and financial-related types of accountability are suggested by donors and have 
been adopted by ACT. This aspect will be elaborated more in Section 4.3 below. 
 
4.3. BA is quasi-instrumental 
 As discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 most of the beneficiary respondents in our study 
demand only non-procedural accountability mechanisms which can be discharged via informal 
mechanisms and concrete actions. However, a small group of beneficiaries held different 
opinions. For instance, an elected formal leader 4  who co-supervises ACT’s Community 
Development Programme in Babelan5 provided a somewhat different perspective to that of the 
informal leader and the majority of participants. He expected BA to go beyond promise 
fulfilment, by delivering a more formal form of accountability, such as thorough disclosure of 
financial information, but not as complex as income statements, statements of financial position 
or cash flow. Another community leader from another village in Babelan struck a similar tone: 
 
‘I want to know the detail of the funds. How much [of the funds] were allocated to our village. 
Then, we can see how ACT runs the programmes and calculate whether they made any sense with 
the allocated funds.’ (Formal leader in a community at Babelan regency, Bekasi, West Java, 
Indonesia and ACT Beneficiary in the Babelan community development programme) 
                                                 
4 In contrast to the informal leader described in footnote 2, the formal leader of a beneficiary community is someone who is formally elected 
by the community members to lead the community. He/she is a civil servant and has the official responsibility to carry out the government 
authority. As a consequence of his/her duties, he/she has to report to leaders within higher hierarchy of government, i.e. the Sub-
District/District Heads. 
5 Babelan regency is located in Bekasi, West Java, Indonesia. There, ACT collaborates with an energy-provider company to conduct a series 
of community development programmes aiming to help residences around the company’s operating area to help increase the economic and 




 Thus, while promise fulfilment continues to be a central element of BA, however, in 
cases where an NGO has not been able to deliver on a promise, some interviewees perceived 
the need to demand greater transparency regarding the allocation of funds received by ACT in 
the form of corporate donors’ CSR contributions in relation to any community development 
programme conducted in their village. Our informal communication in the field with a 
volunteer on the programme revealed that such suspicion from the community leader at 
Babelan programme happened because a corporate donor who provided funding to a 
community development programme asked ACT to prioritise a water provision programme 
rather than other programmes proposed by members of the beneficiary community in the 
participatory meeting. This was also evident in the community leader’s further comment: 
 
‘My community for sure needs the water, but there are other needs as well. That is what I want 
from them (ACT and corporate donor).’ 
 
 Through the instrumental form of accountability, they wish to identify why the 
bottlenecks occur and whether there is any potential misconduct by the NGO. Although they 
do understand that ACT requires a proportion of donor funds to finance the operational costs 
of running a programme, they still expect ACT to be transparent in terms of the donor funds 
allocated to programmes conducted in their community. Additionally, they were not 
particularly concerned with details such as ACT’s income statements, statements of financial 
position or cash flow. The use of resources to implement a review mechanism and the 
subsequent costs associated with it have been identified in other studies as drawbacks, even 
more, when their effective facilitation to BA is difficult to demonstrate (Mir & Bala, 2015; 
Schmitz et al., 2012).  
 Hyndman and McDonnell (2009) suggest that NGO mechanisms and reviews require a 
sufficient number of interactions with the beneficiaries and well-facilitated participation in 
decision-making processes. In our case, a community leader has also suggested an alternative 
for resolving the situation through open communication with relevant decision-makers from 
both the corporate donor and ACT. He felt that existing interactions between them were good, 
but not sufficient to clarify the situation: 
 
‘We should sit together. I want them to follow my suggestion. […] Most representatives from ACT 
and the corporate donor have close communication with me. However, they are only low-level 
staff. They cannot make decisions.’ (Formal leader in a community at Babelan regency, Bekasi, 
West Java, Indonesia and ACT Beneficiary in the Babelan community development programme) 
 
 According to our observations and informal conversations with beneficiaries, volunteers 
and ACT staff, the driving factor behind community leaders’ demands for accountability may 
also be lack of information on their part about the NGO programmes, their prior experience in 
dealing with NGOs6 and being less able to intervene despite their formal authority. It may also 
derive from leaders’ concerns that any problems caused by the NGOs (e.g. misuse of funds, 
unprofessional services) could pose risks to their own legitimacy and credibility since members 
of their community may view them as incapable leaders who have failed to effectively control 
the work being carried out in their area. In this sense, these power actors may consider that 
accountability discharged only through the provision of programmes to beneficiaries is not 
sufficient to engender their trust in ACT and for them to retain their legitimacy in front of their 
community. They need a more formal form of accountability in order to assess the extent to 
                                                 
6 Some other NGOs were irresponsible in dealing with those community leaders. Those NGOs came to the community and conducted FGDs 
with community members. Once they understood the community needs, they used it to make fundraising proposals to prospective donors. 
However, from then, those NGOs disappeared and left the communities without fulfilling their promises. These incidents had created negative 
experiences and apathy amongst both community members and leaders towards NGOs and their works. 
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which ACT is delivering its responsibilities and to ensure that the work of the NGO is in line 
with their own expectations. These power and legitimacy issues may not be too obvious in the 
case of informal community leaders who mentioned in Section 4.1: ‘We did not need to know 
too much detail about who gave the funds’, as they may not have official duties to carry out 
such responsibility. 
 Additionally, when financial accountability becomes a requirement, a further issue lies 
in the time and expertise needed for the preparation of financial reporting on behalf of the 
NGO. As a result, there may be a requirement for reporting to be less complicated whilst still 
remaining informative. An officer at ACT stated: 
 
‘Our consultant suggested that when ACT works in the community, it needs to mention how much 
funds it gets from donors, how much is allocated to the programme, operations and physical 
activities. It’s just like those presented in information boards that you typically see at a 
construction site.’ (ACT community development officer) 
 
 Moreover, the officer also emphasised the need for financial information that could be 
accessed by beneficiaries, to include the total amount of funds and allocation of those funds. 
With such disclosure, beneficiaries would be able to monitor the budget and evaluate whether 
it is tied in with the actual work being carried out on the ground. However, other interviewees 
considered too much transparency regarding financial matters as undesirable. A senior vice 
president at ACT argued: 
 
‘We would not disclose the financial information to our beneficiaries as it may raise unnecessary 
suspicions from beneficiaries’ side. […] Our responsibility to them is to bridge between them and 
the donors.’ (ACT Senior Vice President) 
 
 Moreover, a representative of ACT institutional donor made a similar comment: 
 
‘When there is a question about transparency, we have announced the mock-up7 at the opening of 
the programme.’ (Representation of Institutional Donor who trusted ACT to carry out the 
Integrated Nutritious Workshops) 
 
 It was also apparent that ACT management teams agree on the need for disclosure on 
the amount of funds assigned to its programmes. A senior manager of ACT also explained that 
the disclosure of funds allocated to a beneficiary programme is presented in the form of a mock-
up board shown during the programme’s opening ceremony:  
 
‘We usually show the mock-up containing the total amount of the funds. […] We do not disclose 
the detail to the public.’ (ACT Senior Manager) 
 
 The above quotations demonstrate what we discussed earlier that the less preference of 
ACT management and its donors’ representatives on the formal and standardised financial 
reports does not mean that they do not take up any mechanism to meet such expectation on 
instrumental accountability. Rather, quasi-instrumental levels of disclosure on the total funds 
allocated to its beneficiary programmes, among others through a mock-up board, are welcomed 
and encouraged by both parties to provide necessary accounts to certain beneficiaries, while at 
the same time avoiding too much irrelevant detail that may cause a ‘cold view of the NGOs’ 
(Hyndman & McConville, 2018). 
 The disclosure of financial information is important as a mechanism of BA. It should be 
tailored to satisfy beneficiaries’ demand for a certain level of visibility into the issue rather than 
                                                 
7 The mock-up referred to here is a board that is normally used at the inauguration of an ACT programme. It contains information regarding 
the nominal amount of donations from the donor, the name of the donor, ACT and donor logos, etc.  
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aim to reveal the minutiae of the financial reports, which they do not wish to see (see also, de 
Montclos, 2012). One ACT volunteer made a suggestion of whom the NGO needed to prioritise 
in terms of delivering accountability, in addition to a minimum acceptable mechanism required 
for ACT to be more transparent and encourage greater participation from the community 
leaders as representatives of the beneficiary communities. He explained: 
 
‘There should be transparency between the executives. That is, between the community leaders, 
ACT and the company. The residents might not need the financial disclosures. The community 
leaders demand this transparency because they did not want to be deceived. […] it would be great 
if ACT and the corporate donor provide more detailed information to the village leaders. It will 
raise a sense of mutual trust.’ (ACT Volunteer) 
 
 In suggesting that ACT should provide community leaders with greater financial 
transparency, the volunteer seems to be intending to address the issue of symbolic participation 
(Ebrahim, 2010) and to reduce the imbalance of power between ACT and the community 
leaders. 
 
4.4. BA focuses on beneficiary self-reliance 
 While the above three sections illustrate BA attributes from the side of beneficiaries and 
other ACT stakeholders, the fourth attribute – BA focuses on beneficiary self-reliance – seems 
to be advocated by most ACT management and key volunteer participants of this study. This 
finding is supported by other studies that have highlighted the importance of NGOs living up 
to their ‘raison d’être’ and elevating their beneficiaries from their state of vulnerability 
(Agyemang, Awumbila, Unerman, et al., 2009; Ebrahim, 2003). Internal forces have been 
found to be influencing NGOs towards fulfilling a moral obligation to make a positive 
difference in the living conditions of their beneficiaries (O’Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015; Ospina 
et al., 2002). 
 In our case, participants from the NGO management as well as volunteers have 
suggested that being accountable to beneficiaries means helping them to become more 
autonomous and better able to ‘stand on their own feet’. Often it also means empowering them 
to enhance their resilience and extending NGO cooperation beyond formal completion of the 
programmes. As noted by ACT’s senior vice president, ACT ‘educates beneficiaries that 
vulnerable situations have to be considered as a turning point for them to aim high’. ACT 
management also formally stated their strategic view of BA in their annual report: 
 
‘Empowerment is directed to build self-reliance in the local community after the programme ended, 
while the participatory method is intended to involve beneficiaries actively in the implementation 
of the programme so that they have a sense of ownership in the results of the programme.’ (ACT 
Annual Report, 2012, p. 12)  
 
 By encouraging beneficiaries to take part in the programme, there appears to be an 
unwritten credo shared by ACT officers and volunteers: ‘Give beneficiaries a fish and ACT 
will feed them for a day. Teach beneficiaries to fish, and ACT will feed them for a lifetime.’ 
With this internalised strategic objective of enabling beneficiaries to become more self-reliant, 
one ACT programme manager noted that BA could also be demonstrated through formal 
mechanisms, such as programme audit. He stated:  
 
‘BA is more related to the programme audit, either through visits, assessment on what they have 




 In the event that a programme fails to deliver the expected results in terms of helping 
beneficiaries become more self-reliant, ACT personnel seem to feel personally responsible. 
One volunteer made the following comment: 
 
‘It becomes our problem when the programme is about to finish, and we still have not been able to 
make them (beneficiaries) become independent persons. We aim not only to provide them with a 
fish but also a fishing rod so that they can continue with the fishing activities in future.’ (ACT 
Volunteer) 
 
 Among the indicators used by ACT to measure such a self-reliance objective is to enable 
beneficiaries to bear their own and their families’ costs of living. A programme manager shared 
an ACT success story about helping beneficiaries who had survived the 2010 Merapi eruption 
to become self-reliant: 
 
 
‘They [beneficiaries] stayed in the shelter for about one year. They were given activities such as 
breeding worms, catfish, canaries, etc. […] Some of them have been even more successful (as 
compared to their condition prior to the eruption) because now they could live above the average. 
[…] Then, some of them have been able to buy houses, land, etc.’ (ACT Programme Manager) 
 
 Another indicator used by ACT to evaluate the success of their beneficiary self-reliance 
initiatives is beneficiaries’ and their networks’ ability to trust ACT and support the organisation 
to deliver more benefit to those in need by optimising the knowledge, skills, norms and beliefs 
shared between them and their networks. Some donors, volunteers and employees were once 
beneficiaries themselves, in receipt of assistance from ACT. Their experiences of disaster, 
social conflict and/or poverty meant that they went through life journeys together and 
developed the motivation to help others in need as a result of them overcoming adversity 
themselves. The ACT president reflected: 
 
‘By helping others, we teach them lessons on how to give. […] When Mount Merapi in Yogyakarta 
erupted in 2010, the first logistics that were distributed to our refugee camps in Yogyakarta came 
from our former beneficiaries of Pangalengan earthquake in Bandung. It was so awesome. […] 
Social sensitivity, caring and empathy flourished in the souls of our former beneficiaries.’  
 
5. Discussion  
 The findings of this study are broadly in line with the prior studies (for instance Awio 
et al., 2011; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2007) which observe that BA does not have to be limited 
to any formal mechanism of accountability such as the accountability to the donor and other 
influential stakeholders. Rather, it needs to be viewed more widely and connectedly, such as in 
terms of the four attributes suggested by this study.  
 Our study presents an empirical analysis that BA, from the perspectives of participants 
of this study, differs between actors and across contexts. It is subjectively constructed through 
their expectations, experiences and roles in the society. Within the four attributes, BA can be 
seen as casually demanded by ACT beneficiaries. From this perspective, BA aims to fulfil the 
promise of delivering services to beneficiaries on a timely basis and in an effective manner 
(Brown & Moore, 2001; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2007; Roberts, 1991).  
 It is observed, however, that BA can also be reflected in its quasi-instrumental 
perspective, as perceived by the formal leaders of beneficiaries’ communities as well as some 
of ACT’s volunteers. These latter stakeholders, although they do not represent the majority of 
ACT’s stakeholders, tend to express their demands for functional accountability (e.g. through 
financial reports and disclosures). For the community leaders, such an expectation may arise 
as a way of retaining their legitimacy in the eyes of their community, while for the volunteers, 
the demand for more quasi-instrumental accountability may result from their role as 
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intermediaries between ACT, community leaders and beneficiary communities. We find that 
donors play roles in directing NGOs to meet the expectations of the quasi-instrumental 
accountability. Nevertheless, apart from what has been found by Uddin and Belal (2019), we 
observe a further specific finding that donors support the discharge of BA in varying degrees. 
Donors acknowledge that beneficiary participation, concrete actions and intensive 
communications are essential for BA. However, from our study, we find that donors tend not 
to favour disclosing too much information (specifically financial matters) to beneficiaries. At 
the same time, donors still require NGOs to prepare both financial and programme audits for 
their own evaluation requirements.  
 In addition, this study reveals that BA is perceived by most of ACT’s officers, donors 
and volunteers as a mechanism for assisting beneficiaries to regain their self-reliance after 
periods of vulnerability. This is also in line with a recent observation made by O’Leary (2017). 
This study, moreover, notes that self-reliance is not necessarily stimulated by the involvement 
of beneficiaries in the final decision-making process. Such an approach, according to some 
prior studies, is perceived as pseudo-participation because many beneficiaries are not involved 
in the decision-making process (Kilby, 2006; Mir & Bala, 2015; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2010). 
Instead, this study observes that an ‘adjustable participation’ approach can be applied using 
various methods depending on the condition of the beneficiaries and the stage of the NGOs’ 
programmes, and is thus in line with the degrees of participation suggested by Ebrahim (2003). 
  In programmes related to emergency responses, ACT adopts promise fulfilment and 
timely aid delivery in discharging BA (this mechanism was also perceived as a means of BA 
practice by prior studies, such as Awio et al., 2011; Cavill & Sohail, 2007; Kilby, 2006). 
Beneficiaries who are involved in the emergency response programme are mostly assumed to 
require more time to adjust to the vulnerability that they face, thus preventing them from being 
more actively involved in any decision-making process.  
 Meanwhile, interactions between ACT and beneficiaries in emergency response have 
resulted in smoother recovery efforts and can lead to the development of a more sustainable 
society (Kopinak, 2013). In this sense, when beneficiaries have undergone a series of recovery 
processes and are perceived to be ready for further engagement, then ACT adopts another 
mechanism of engaging the beneficiaries in its programme by positioning them as both the 
recipients and implementers of the NGO’s programme. ACT also provides additional 
resources, which enable the beneficiaries to become self-reliant and even become part of the 
NGO’s volunteer corps. These mechanisms resemble the achievement of beneficiaries’ self-
reliance, which goes beyond what prior studies (e.g. Cavill & Sohail, 2007) describe as a 
mechanism for involving beneficiaries in the decision-making process. Moreover, the above 
discussions provide an insight that helps us to shape an informed definition as perceived by the 
participants of this study, in which BA can be defined as: non-procedural practices of 
positioning beneficiaries as the central focus of NGOs’ activities.  
  The above discussion has considered that the practice of BA is strongly related to the 
factor of trust resulting from the intensity of interaction and level of closeness between 
representatives of NGOs and beneficiaries (O’Leary, 2017; Roberts, 1991). It also supports the 
argument that different aspects of BA mechanisms do not take place homogeneously across all 
stages of stakeholder engagement as well as among various groups of beneficiaries (O’Leary, 
2017; O’Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008).  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this study we have conceptualised beneficiary accountability (BA) in terms of four 
attributes (i.e. BA is casually demanded, action based, quasi-instrumental and focuses on 
beneficiary self-reliance).  We have argued that it is more closely related to informal forms of 
accountability rather than the formal forms commonly associated with donor accountability. 
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Given this informal nature, NGOs can be supported by their stakeholders (e.g. volunteers) 
when it comes to discharging BA.  
The study provides several empirical, theoretical and practical contributions. 
Empirically, it complements prior studies (e.g. Ebrahim, 2010; Edwards & Hulme, 1996) which 
have outlined the conceptual mechanisms involved in the discharge of BA, by examining how 
BA is operationalised. Therefore, it responds to calls (e.g. by Banks et al., 2015; Boomsma & 
O’Dwyer, 2014) for a more comprehensive understanding of BA practices. Additionally, 
taking the case of a large NGO sets the novelty of this study apart from the other case studies 
that have examined the various features of BA (e.g. Awio et al., 2011; O’Leary, 2017). These 
studies, in contrast, have focused on relatively small, grass roots organisations on the ground. 
Despite its broad social networks and large scale of resources and operations, our case NGO is 
different from typical big NGOs. Kilby (2006) notes that big NGOs are less likely to be 
accountable to their beneficiaries. However, the case NGO provides contrary evidence which 
can inspire other big NGOs not to leave beneficiaries outside their accountability loop, e.g. by 
gaining assistance from their stakeholders (e.g. volunteers and donors) to discharge 
accountability to beneficiaries. 
Theoretically, this study contributes to the BA related prior studies within the NGO 
accountability literature by offering a conceptual framework of BA. We argue that this 
framework examines different attributes of BA perceived by different NGO actors, e.g. 
beneficiaries, donors, NGO managers, volunteers and community leaders. Application of this 
framework in our empirical setting illuminates what works in practice for the benefit of 
beneficiaries who appear to have been neglected in NGO accountability research and practices.  
For NGO managers, this study provides necessary empirical evidence on the positive 
role played by the volunteers, partners and donors in the development and conceptualisation of 
BA, which may later contribute to the development of more sustainable NGO operations. This 
study also indicates that the ability to foster close relations with the beneficiaries is not only 
held by grass roots NGOs (e.g. as noted by Awio et al., 2011; O’Leary, 2017). Large NGOs 
may also attain the long-term trust of their beneficiaries by showing their concrete actions plus 
intense social interactions that are supported by the NGO stakeholders. In addition, NGO 
managers can present a mock-up board containing sufficient information of financial details 
concerning their programmes to meet any expectation on quasi-instrumental accountability by 
some beneficiaries.  
This study opens several avenues for future research, such as how the distinct 
characteristics of different NGOs and those located in other settings may think about their 
approach to BA. We encourage further research examining the operationalisation and 
challenges of BA. We have very briefly noted the importance of a trusting relationship between 
beneficiaries and NGOs in facilitating aspects of BA including self-reliance. Future studies can 
unpick the role of trust more comprehensively, examining whether it is an antecedent or 
consequence of BA. Finally, we invite future researchers to provide further empirical 
illustrations of the conceptual framework of BA articulated in this paper in order to contribute 
to the operationalisation of BA. 
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Table 1: Summary of Interviewees and FGD Participants 
  
Volunteer Beneficiaries ACT 
Management 
Donor Expert TOTAL 
Interviewees 5 11 
(4 community leaders and 7 
grass root beneficiaries) 
20 4 6 46 
FGD 
Participants 
0 26 0 2 0 28 
TOTAL 5 37 20 6 6 74 
 
 
